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Abstract
We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is
either uni- or bidimensional. We study two voting procedures widely used in the literature.
The Stackelberg (ST) procedure assumes that votes are taken one dimension at a time according
to an exogenously specied sequence. The Kramer-Shepsle (KS) procedure also assumes that
votes are taken separately on each dimension, but not in a sequential way. A vector of policies
is a Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium if each component coincides with the majority choice on this
dimension given the other components of the vector. We study the existence and uniqueness
of the ST and KS equilibria, and we compare them, looking e.g. at the impact of the ordering
of votes for ST and identifying circumstances under which ST and KS equilibria coincide. In
the process, we state explicitly the assumptions on the utility function that are needed for
these equilibria to be well behaved. We especially stress the importance of single crossing
conditions, and we identify two variants of these assumptions: a marginal version that is
imposed on all policy dimensions separately, and a joint version whose denition involves both
policy dimensions.
Keywords: Unidimensional and bidimensional type space, single crossing, one-sided sepa-
rability
JEL Codes: D72, H41
1 Introduction
It is well known that majority voting suers from what Bernheim and Slavov (2009) call the
\curse of multidimensionality": when the policy space is suciently rich, there is no policy
option that gathers a majority of votes when faced with all other possible options {i.e., there
is no Condorcet winner (see e.g. Plott 1967, Davis, DeGroot and Hinich 1972, McKelvey,
Ordeshook and Ungar 1980, Banks, Duggan and Le Breton 2006 and Banks and Austen-Smith
1999).
In all rigorous formal versions of this result the respective roles of the properties of the
types' distribution function and of utility functions are not always clearly disentangled. For
instance, in the spatial model of politics (where preferences are Euclidean), the symmetry of
preferences is imposed and the focus is exclusively on the distribution of voters' types. The
rst objective of this paper is to ll this small gap and to oer a pedestrian analysis of the
existence of a Condorcet winner with a unidimensional type space.
Faced with this \curse of multidimensionality", the applied political economy literature
has followed various directions, including the obvious one of restricting the policy space to
be unidimensional. Several lines of attack recognizing the issue of multidimensionality have
consisted in a detailed game theoretical description of the collective decision making process
and a subsequent analysis of its equilibrium outcomes. One example of such an approach is the
analysis of sequential bargaining by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Banks and Duggan (2000).
Another, more recent, example consists in the analysis of an electoral competition game with
nonseparable preferences, where candidates dier in their exogenous characteristics (Krasa and
Polborn (2009)) or strengths on certain policy dimensions (Krasa and Polborn (2010)) and
where they are uncertain about voters' preferences. In this paper, we adopt a bidimensional
policy space and we focus on two widely used approaches having in common that votes never
take place simultaneously on all dimensions.
The rst approach assumes that citizens vote sequentially on each dimension. An exogenous
ordering of the dimensions is considered and, at each voting stage, the outcomes of the preceding
1
votes are known to the voters. For instance, when there are two dimensions, a rst majority
vote is organized over one of the policy dimensions and is followed by a second majority vote
over the other dimension. We call Stackelberg (ST) equilibria the policies that can be supported
at equilibrium for a particular ordering of the dimensions. This sequential resolution has been
used by many authors in political economy models (see e.g. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999,
Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby 2004, Cremer, De Donder and Gahvari 2004, Cremer et al. 2007,
De Donder, Le Breton and Peluso 2009, Etro 2006, Gregorini 2009, Haimanko, Le Breton and
Weber 2005).
The second approach assumes instead that there is no sequential ordering of the votes, but
that they are taken separately on each dimension. Under the presumption that all dimensions
except one have been settled, citizens cast their vote over the residual dimension. A solution
is consistent if the vector of policies obtained through that procedure is self-supporting in a
Nash-like manner. This idea has been independently developed by Kramer (1972) and Shepsle
(1979) and hereafter we will call Kramer-Shepsle's equilibria (KS) the policy vectors meeting
this consistency condition. More precisely, a vector is a Kramer-Shepsle's equilibrium if, for any
dimension, the corresponding component in the vector coincides with the majority choice on this
dimension given the other components of the policy vector. Shepsle considers the case where
the collective decision processes may dier across dimensions and demonstrates existence under
quite general conditions. He also illustrates through examples that the set of KS equilibria may
display peculiar features. To the best of our knowledge, the only other theoretical contributions
are two unpublished papers by Banks and Duggan (2004) and Duggan (2001) who examined the
existence issue from a general perspective. This concept has also been studied by the applied
political economy literature, e.g. by De Donder and Hindriks (1998), Diba and Feldman (1984),
Nechyba (1997), Sadanand and Williamson (1991).
In this paper, we provide an analysis of the KS and ST equilibria in a general framework
with a bidimensional policy space. We study their existence, uniqueness and we compare them,
looking e.g. at the impact of the ordering of votes for ST and identifying circumstances under
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which ST and KS equilibria coincide. In the process, we state explicitly the assumptions on
the utility function that are needed for these equilibria to be well-behaved. We especially stress
the importance of single-crossing conditions, and we identify two variants of these assumptions:
a \marginal" version that is imposed on all policy dimensions separately, and a \joint" ver-
sion whose denition involves both policy dimensions. We perform this analysis rst with a
unidimensional type space, and then with a bidimensional type space.
Our results run as follows. Starting with a unidimensional type space, we illustrate the
\curse of multidimensionality" (of the policy space): when we assume that the utility function
satises both marginal and joint single-crossing, there is generically no Condorcet winner and,
perhaps more surprisingly, in most cases and for any policy proposal, it is possible to nd a
direction that is favored by almost all voters. We then study the KS and ST equilibria in this
setting. We show that under marginal single-crossing, the KS solution(s) coincide with the
set of componentwise ideal point(s) of the median type. Under strict concavity of the utility
function, this implies that there exists a unique KS solution which is the unique ideal point of
the median type. Assuming in addition strategic complementarity between policy dimensions
results in the reduced utility function in the rst stage of voting (given the anticipated choice in
the second stage of voting) being single-crossing, so that the KS equilibrium coincides with the
ST equilibrium. Although single-crossing and single-peakedness are two logically independent
properties, we provide conditions on the derivatives of the direct utility function that ensure
that a majority of the electorate has single-peaked reduced utility functions.
We next study a specic environment that has received a lot of attention in dierent lit-
eratures (e.g. on nation formation) and which does not satisfy the marginal single-crossing
property. In this environment, voters diering in their preference for the type of a public good
have to choose both its type and its quantity. While the majority-chosen public good's type
does not depend on its quantity, the opposite relationship is not true, a situation we dub one-
sided separability. The literature has focused on the ST equilibrium where voters choose rst
the public good's quantity. We show that this equilibrium corresponds to the KS equilibrium,
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but that the ST equilibrium with the opposite sequence of votes (which, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been studied previously) is more complex, with the identity of the second-
stage decisive voter being aected by the rst-stage voting decision. We provide a thorough
analysis of how rst-stage voting is impacted in that case (i.e., how voters bias their rst-stage
voting choices when anticipating the impact on the second-stage decisive voter's identity).
We then move to a bidimensional type space. There is little we can say at this level
of generality about the existence or characteristics of the Stackelberg equilibria, and their
relationship with the KS equilibria. We thus content ourselves with providing an example with
a discrete number of types diering both in the location and in the shape of their indierence
curves and where i) there are multiple KS equilibria, ii) not all KS equilibria correspond to ST
equilibria (whatever the ordering of the votes) and iii) some KS equilibria do not correspond
to any voter's most-preferred policy.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the one-dimensional type general
framework. Its rst subsection analyzes simultaneous voting, the second subsection studies
and compares Kramer-Shepsle and Stackelberg equilibria, while the third subsection is devoted
to the analysis of a specic environment studied e.g. in the nation formation literature. Section
3 focuses on the case with two-dimensional types while section 4 concludes. Most proofs are
relegated to Appendices.
2 One-Dimensional Types
Throughout the paper, we consider a population of voters who have to select a public policy in
a two-dimensional policy space. A policy choice is therefore a vector (x; y) 2 Z; where the set
of feasible policy choices Z is assumed to be a convex, compact and rectangular subset X  Y
of <2.1 In this section, we assume that each voter is described by a one-dimensional type
1This assumption implies that X and Y are compact intervals of the real line for i = 1; 2: The rectangularity
assumption implies that the choice over one dimension does not have any implication on the feasible choices
over the other dimension. A more general case is the subject of Banks and Duggan (2004).
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 2 <. The statistical distribution of types is given by a continuous cumulative distribution
function F whose support is the interval [; ] of <, with f denoting the corresponding density.
The utility of a citizen of type  for policy (x; y) is denoted by U(; x; y) that is assumed to
be twice continuously dierentiable and such that: @
2U(;x;y)
@x2
< 0 and @
2U(;x;y)
@y2
< 0:2 Further,
we will assume that for all  2 [; ], for all y 2 Y (respectively x 2 X), the maximum
of U(; :; y) (respectively U(; x; :)) is attained in the interior of X (respectively Y ).3 The
following examples illustrate the broad spectrum of applications covered by this framework.4
Example 1 (Absolute Intensity of the Preference for Public Goods)
Let Z = [0; x][0; y],  > 0 and U(; x; y) = P (x; y) (x+y) where P is twice continuously
dierentiable, increasing and such that @
2P (x;y)
@x2
< 0, @
2P (x;y)
@y2
< 0, @P (0;y)
@y
= @P (x;0)
@x
= 1,
 @P (x;y)
@y
< 1,  @P (x;y)
@x
< 1 for all (x; y) 2 Z. In this setting, x and y denote the quantities of two
dierent pure public goods produced under constant returns to scale and nanced through per
capita taxation. The parameter  reects the intensity of the preference for the bundle (x; y)
of public goods (aggregated through P ) with respect to the private numeraire.
Example 2 (Spatial Politics with Dierentiated weights)
Let Z = [; ]2 and U(; x; y) =  ()(x )2  ()(y )2 where  and  are two positive
continuously dierentiable functions. In this general framework, the parameter  plays two
roles. On one hand, it describes the favorite policy bundle of a citizen regardless of the specic
features of  and  . On the other hand, it also determines through these functions the respective
weights placed by a citizen on the two dimensions. In the particular case where () =  () = 1
for all  in [; ], we obtain the spatial model of politics with the extra assumption that the
support of the distribution is one dimensional (precisely here the diagonal).
Example 3 (Local Jurisdictions, Nation Formation and \One and a Half Dimen-
2These sign conditions imply that, for all , U(; x; y) is strictly concave in x for all y and strictly concave
in y for all x.
3Most of our analysis extends to settings with corner solutions at the cost of some additional notation which
has been avoided here.
4The working paper version of this paper (downloadable at
http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2010/pdd kramer 0110.pdf) contains several other examples.
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sional" Preferences)
Let Z = [0; x]  [0; 1],  2 [0; 1] and U(; x; y) = v(x)	(y   )   x where v is such that
v(x) > 0; v0(x) > 0,v00(x) < 0 and v0(0) =1; v0(x)	(0) < 1, 	(d) > 0;	 is increasing to the left
of 0, decreasing to the right of 0 and such that 	00(d) < 0. In this setting, x denotes the quantity
of a pure public good while y now denotes a horizontal characteristic of this public good. This
policy environment has been analyzed by many authors, including Alesina, Baqir and Easterly
(1999), Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004), Perroni and Scharf (2001) in the analysis of local
jurisdictions, and Etro (2006) and Gregorini (2009) in the exploration of models of nation
formation. It is also reminiscent of the voting environment of Groseclose (2007) where the
horizontal dimension denotes ideology while the other dimension represents valence (dened as
an advantage that a candidate has due to a non-policy factor, such as incumbency or charisma).
All voters have the same preference on the valence dimension (hence the term \one-and-a-half
dimensional" coined by Groseclose, 2007).
We rst study the simultaneous voting game over the two dimensions before turning to
sequential voting and the Kramer-Shepsle solution.
2.1 Simultaneous Voting
We now show that in the context of simultaneous voting over a bidimensional policy space with
unidimensional voters' types, the fact that utility functions satisfy reasonable \single-crossing"
conditions does not guarantee the existence of a Condorcet winner. On the contrary, for any
policy proposal, it is always possible to propose an alternative policy that is favored by almost
all voters. For most of the paper, we assume the following monotonicity property:
Assumption 1 (Marginal Single-Crossing) We assume that
@2U(; x; y)
@@x
> 0 and
@2U(; x; y)
@@y
> 0
for all (x; y) 2 Z and  2 <.
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Assumption 1 simply states that the marginal utility of both dimensions increases monotoni-
cally with the type of the agent. This monotonicity assumption implies that the classical single-
crossing condition (which states that \leftist voters tend to favor left policies more than voters
who are rightist in political preferences" (Myerson, 1996, p.23)) is satised on each dimension
separately, hence the term of marginal single-crossing assumption.
It is easy to see that Assumption 1 is satised in Example 1. As for Example 2, we obtain
@2U(;x;y)
@@x
= 2()  20()(x  ). The rst term is always positive while the second term can
take negative values. It is enough to bound the second term. Assumption 1 holds as soon as
0() is not too large. If we denote by m the minimum of () over [; ], then it will hold
whenever j0()j < m
  . The same analysis applies to
@2U(;x;y)
@@y
.
Assumption 1 does not hold for Example 3. We obtain @
2U(;x;y)
@@x
=  v0(x)	0(y   ) and
@2U(;x;y)
@@y
=  	00(y   ). The second-order derivative is always positive but the sign of the
rst-order derivative depends upon the position of y with respect to : its sign is positive if
and only if y > . This example is thus not covered by the results of this section and, given its
importance in the literature, is analyzed separately in section 2.3.
We now introduce this denition.
Denition 1 Assume people vote over the set 
. We call ! 2 
 a majority (voting) equilib-
rium, also called a Condorcet winner, if there is no !0 6= ! with !0 2 
 that is strictly preferred
by more than one half of the voters to !:
We denote by x(y; ) (respectively, y(x; )) individual 's most-preferred value of x (resp., of
y) for any given y (resp., given x). The following lemma (proved in Appendix 1) shows that the
strict concavity of the utility function guarantees both the existence and unicity of a majority
winner when voting over x for any given y (resp., over y for any x).5 Moreover, if Assumption
1 holds, Lemma 1 shows that the most-preferred value of x (respectively, of y) is increasing in
, for any given y (resp., given x), and that the individual with the (unique) median type med
is decisive in both choices if they are taken separately.
5The elementary proof consists in showing that the CDF of marginal peaks has no at sections.
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Lemma 1 Let U(; x; y) be twice continuously dierentiable and such that: @
2U(;x;y)
@x2
< 0 and
@2U(;x;y)
@y2
< 0: Then:
i) For all y (respectively x), there exists a unique (one-dimensional) Condorcet winner,
which we denote by xm(y) (resp., ym(x)).
ii) Under Assumption 1, the most-preferred value of x (respectively, of y) is increasing in
, for any given y (resp., given x):
@x (y; )
@
> 0 and
@y (x; )
@
> 0:
Moreover, xm(y) (resp., ym(x)) corresponds to the value of x (resp., of y) that is most-preferred
by the individual with the median type, med:
xm(y) = x(y; med) 8y 2 <;
ym(x) = y(x; med) 8x 2 <:
Observe that we have imposed the strict concavity of the utility function separately with
respect x and to y, but not with respect to (x; y). We then introduce the following denition.
Denition 2 We call (x; y) a componentwise ideal point of an individual with type  if
ArgMax
x2X
U(; x; y) = x and ArgMax
y2Y
U(; x; y) = y.
The following proposition shows that, if a Condorcet winner exists when voting simultane-
ously over the two dimensions, then it must be a componentwise ideal point of an individual
with the median type, med:
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Proposition 1 Consider the bidimensional majority voting setting with a unidimensional type
space where Assumption 1 is satised. Then, the majority equilibrium (x; y) under simultane-
ous voting over both dimensions, if it exists, must be a componentwise ideal point of the median
type voter med:
x = x(y; med) and y = y(x; med):
6An ideal point of an individual of type  {i.e., a choice (x; y) such that (x; y) = ArgMax
(x;y)2XY
U(; x; y); is
of course a componentwise ideal point for such an individual. But the converse is not true, as we show in an
example available upon request.
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We now investigate under what conditions a vector (xs; ys) (called the status quo hereafter)
is preferred by a majority of voters to any local deviation. We establish the conditions under
which an individual votes in favor of a motion moving away from the status quo in a (arbitrary)
direction d = (dx; dy) 2 <2. The change in the utility of a voter of type  induced by d is7
'()  @U(; (x
s; ys))
@x
dx +
@U(; (xs; ys))
@y
dy:
The population of voters who favor a move from the status quo in the direction d is composed
of all the types for which '() > 0: A local Condorcet winner is dened as a policy pair (xs; ys)
for which there exists an " > 0 such that for any vector (dx; dy) 2 <2 belonging to the unitary
circle, the mass of citizens who strictly prefer (xs + "dx; y
s + "dy) to (x
s; ys) is less than or at
most equal to 1
2
. We introduce the function
(d) =
Z
f2[;]:'()>0g
dF;
which measures the proportion of voters favoring a deviation in direction d from the status quo
(xs; ys). We show in Appendix 2 that if (xs; ys) is a local Condorcet winner, then (d)  1
2
for
all d. This implies that, to check that a policy pair is a local Condorcet winner, it is sucient
to look at the sign of the function '.
Observe that '(med) = 0 since (x
; y) is a componentwise ideal point of individual med.
From '0()  @2U(;x;y)
@@x
dx +
@2U(;x;y)
@@y
dy, using Assumption 1, we obtain that '
0() > 0 if
dx > 0 and dy > 0, which means that all individuals with  > med are in favor of directions
d with positive deviations from the status quo. By denition, this interval of types represents
one half of the polity, so that (d) = 1=2. Similarly, '0() < 0 if dx < 0 and dy < 0, so
that all individuals with  < med (and only them) favor the direction d, and (d) = 1=2.
In words, if the deviation considered either increases or decreases both dimensions, then the
individuals favoring this deviation are to be found only on one side of the median and are thus
not numerous enough to defeat the status quo.
7The function ' also depends on d and on the status quo, but we simplify the notation by writing '(): It
is a rst-order approximation of the change in utility - see Appendix 2 for the full statement.
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We now turn to deviations with both a positive and a negative component. Individuals
with  > med benet from the positive component of the deviation but suer from the negative
component, and vice versa for the individuals with  < med. The set of voters who favor such
a deviation may then be disjoint and could comprise both people above and below med. We
now characterize this set and study whether it represents more than one half of the electorate.
Consider without loss of generality the case where d is such that dx > 0 and dy < 0. Recall
that voters who favor a direction d are such that '() > 0. Denoting by
MRS() =
@U(;x;y)
@x
@U(;x;y)
@y
the (absolute value of)8 the marginal rate of substitution between x and y at (x; y) for
individual , we obtain that voters who favor the direction d are such that  > med together
with MRS() >  dy=dx (i.e., those for whom the utility gain from a larger value of x is
larger than the utility loss from the lower value of y); or such that  < med together with
MRS() <  dy=dx (i.e., those for whom the utility gain from a smaller value of y is larger
than the utility loss from the larger value of x). The identication of the coalition of citizens
 (dx; dy) supporting the deviation is illustrated on Figure 1 below, where we represent the
MRS measured at (x; y) as a function of . It is important to note that this coalition need
not be connected.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The construction itself shows that the circumstances for having (x; y) undefeated are very
exceptional. Indeed, given the choice of  dy=dx, if the set

 2 [; ] :MRS() =  dy=dx
	
has
measure 0 for F , then it must be the case that the coalition  (dx; dy) and its complement
[; ]n(dx; dy) have both a measure equal to 12 with respect to F for the policy (x; y) to be
8Note that, under Assumption 1, the marginal rate of substitution at (x; y) is well dened for all  6= med.
Further, it is negative for all individuals since @U(; x; y)=@x > 0 and @U(; x; y)=@y > 0 for all  > med
while @U(; x; y)=@x < 0 and @U(; x; y)=@y < 0 for all  < med: Slightly abusing notation, we denote by
MRS(med) the limit, as  tends towards med, of MRS(). From Assumption 1 and l'Ho^pital's rule, it is easy
to see that this limit exists.
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a local Condorcet winner. This may happen for some specic value of  dy=dx but then a small
perturbation of dy=dx is likely to destroy this property.
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We then impose further structure on the problem in the hope of nding circumstances under
which a local Condorcet winner exists. An interesting benchmark, often used in the political
economy literature, is the case where the utility function exhibits the single-crossing or Spence-
Mirrlees's condition (Gans and Smart 1996, Greenberg and Weber 1986, Rothstein 1990){i.e.,
where the marginal rate of substitution is monotone10 in :
Assumption 2 (Local Joint Single-Crossing) Let (x; y) be a componentwise ideal point
of the median type. We say that U satises the property of local joint single-crossing with
respect to (x; y) if
@U(; x; y)=@x
@U(; x; y)=@y
is strictly increasing in 
for all  2 <.
We then obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 In the bidimensional majority voting setting with a unidimensional type space,
let (x; y) be a componentwise ideal point of a voter with median type. Under Assumptions 1
(marginal single-crossing) and 2 (local joint single-crossing), then :
a) The policy bundle (x; y) is defeated at the majority by almost every deviation d such that
dxdy < 0.
b) Moreover, there exists a deviation ~d = ( ~dx; ~dy) with ~dx ~dy < 0 that is preferred by all voters
(except med) to (x
; y).
In order to prove Proposition 2, we use Figure 2, where we make use of Assumption 2. The
rst panel depicts the case where MRS(med) <  dy=dx. In that case, all individuals below
9This reasoning does not hold when MRS () is constant since, for any given directional deviation, the
society is always divided equally.
10The subsequent analysis would carry through to the case where the MRS is monotone decreasing in type.
Note that there is no logical connection between the two single-crossing conditions that we study (Assumptions
1 and 2) in the sense that neither implies nor precludes the other.
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med prefer the deviation. This is also the case for individuals with  > med who are such
that MRS() >  dy=dx. A strict majority favors d if this second group is not empty, which
is the case provided that MRS() >  dy=dx {i.e., that dy is not too large or dx not too small
(in absolute values). Figure 2(b) illustrates the case where MRS(med) >  dy=dx. In that
case, all people with  > med favor the deviation, together with individuals with  < med
for which MRS() <  dy=dx. As soon as this second group is not empty (which is the case if
MRS() <  dy=dx{i.e., that dy is not too small or dx not too large, in absolute values), a strict
majority of voters favor the deviation. This proves Proposition 2 (a).
The third panel of Figure 2 shows that, if the deviation ~d is such that MRS(med) =  dy=dx,
all voters (except of course med) favor this deviation, proving part b) of Proposition 2.
Insert Figure 2 about here
While the reader may not be surprised by part a) of Proposition 2, part b) is more surprising,
since in that case there is a unanimity against the median voter's most-preferred policy, even
under marginal and joint single-crossing conditions.
In Example 2, additional assumptions on () and  () are necessary to ensure that U
is strictly concave and satises the property of local joint single-crossing with respect to the
unique ideal point (x; y) of the median type, since
@U(; x; y)=@x
@U(; x; y)=@y
=
()
 ()
med   
med    =
()
 ()
:
For instance, in the case where [; ] = [0; 1] and  () = 1, the property will be satised
whenever 0() > 0. The following slight variant of Example 2 provides another illustration.
Let U(; x; y) =  (x  cos )2   (y   sin )2 with  2 3
2
; 2

. We obtain that
@U(; x; y)
@x
=  2(x  cos ) and @U(; x; y)
@y
=  2(y   sin ):
Since @
2U(;x;y)
@x@
=  2 sin  > 0 and @2U(;x;y)
@y@
= 2 cos  > 0, Assumption 1 is satised. If F is
uniform on

3
2
; 2

, we have med =
7
4
and (x; y) =
 
1
2
p
2; 1
2
p
2

. Moreover,
MRS() =MRS(; x; y) =
cos 7
4
  cos 
sin 7
4
  sin  : (1)
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We then deduce that MRS 0() = sin   sin   1
2
p
2
+(cos )
1
2
p
2 cos 
(  sin   12
p
2)
2 . A careful analysis shows
that MRS 0() < 0 over the relevant range of values of  i.e. up to a sign reversal, U satises
the property of local joint single-crossing with respect to the unique ideal point (x; y) of the
median type in that variant of Example 2. Any motion from (x; y) in the direction ( 1; 1)
will be supported by almost all agents.11 Indeed, from (1), using L'Hospital's rule we obtain
MRS(
7
4
) =
g0(7
4
)
h0
 
7
4
 ;
where g()  cos 7
4
  cos  and h() = sin 7
4
  sin . Since g0(7
4
) =   sin 7
4
= 1
2
p
2 and
h0
 
7
4

=   cos 7
4
=  1
2
p
2, we obtain that MRS(7
4
) =  1. If we want to work back in terms
of normalized gradients, we get the vector ( 1; 1) as we need to multiply both g0(7
4
) and h0(7
4
)
by  1.
The take home message of this section is then that, except in very peculiar circumstances
such as a perfectly symmetrical utility function, there is little hope of nding a Condorcet
winner when voting simultaneously over the two dimensions, even when the type space is
unidimensional and single-crossing conditions are satised.
We now move to the other equilibrium concepts studied in this paper, those proposed by
Kramer and Shepsle, and by Stackelberg.
2.2 Kramer-Shepsle and Stackelberg equilibria
Let us examine rst the Kramer-Shepsle equilibria. We rst prove existence of such equilibria for
a class of problems much larger than the class of problems considered in the previous section.
Let U be the class of utility functions U dened on Z such that U1y = U(:; y) (respectively
U2x = U(x; :)) is strictly concave on X (respectively Y ) for all y (respectively for all x). A
prole is a mapping U from

; 

into U . We denote by R1 (respectively R2) the set of weak
orders on X (respectively Y ) induced by strictly concave utility functions on X (respectively
Y ). Given U and (x; y) 2 Z, we denote by M1(y) (respectively M2(x)) the set of Condorcet
11We thank the associate editor for pointing this out.
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winners on the rst dimension (respectively on the second dimension) when the choice on the
second dimension (respectively the rst dimension) is y (respectively x).12
Denition 3 Given a prole U, a Kramer-Shepsle (or KS) equilibrium for U is a policy vector
(xKS; yKS) such that
xKS 2M1(yKS) and yKS 2M2(xKS):
We prove in Appendix 3 that KS equilibria always exist for any prole U satisfying the
above assumptions.
Under Assumption 1, the correspondence M is a function: M1(y) = xm(y) = x(y; med)
and M2(y) = ym(x) = y(x; med). This implies that (x; y) is a KS equilibrium i (x; y) is a
componentwise ideal point of a median type described by the following rst order conditions:
@U(med; x
KS; yKS)
@x
= 0 and
@U(med; x
KS; yKS)
@y
= 0: (2)
We have thus proved the following.
Proposition 3 In the bidimensional majority voting setting with a unidimensional type space,
under Assumption 1, any KS equilibrium (xKS; yKS) coincides with a componentwise ideal point
of the med type voter.
Let us now move to the set of Stackelberg (or ST) equilibria that arise when there is a
sequence of two votes. We assume (without loss of generality at this stage) that individuals
are rst called to vote over x and then, after having observed the voting outcome of this rst
round, that they vote over y. We solve for these ST equilibria and compare them with both
the KS equilibria and with the ST equilibria under the opposite sequence (where voters choose
rst y and then x).
Solving backward, we know from Lemma 1 (i) that, for any outcome x in the rst stage,
there exists a unique majority equilibrium ym(x) in the second stage. From Lemma 1 (ii), we
12Under Assumption 1, these sets are singletons but in general it is not necessarily the case. However it is
straightforward that both of them are non empty intervals.
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know that under Assumption 1, ym(x) is the most-preferred value of y of the median type med.
In any case, this implies that, in the rst stage, the reduced utility of a citizen of type  for x
is equal to
V (; x) = U(; x; ym(x)):
Denition 4 A Stackelberg (or ST) equilibrium when voters choose rst x and then y is a
policy vector (xST ; yST ) such thatZ
f2[;]:V (;x) V (;xST )>0g
f()d  1
2
for all x 2 R
and yST = ym(x
ST ):
Of course, the rst part of the denition of ST is not easy to test in general. Under the
presumption that the function ym (x) is dierentiable, the marginal rst-stage utility of a citizen
of type  is given by
@V (; x)
@x
=
@U(; x; ym (x))
@x
+
@U(; x; ym (x))
@y
dym (x)
dx
= 0: (3)
The rst term of (3) describes the direct eect of varying x on the individual's utility, while the
second term describes the indirect eect through variations in the second-stage voting outcome.
We will make an extensive use of the following assumption:
Assumption 3 (Strategic complementarity) We assume that the two policy dimensions
are strategic complements:
@2U(; x; y)
@x@y
 0: (4)
From this assumption, we deduce the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the function U(; x; y) is strictly concave in (x; y) for all  and satises As-
sumptions 1 (marginal single-crossing) and 3 (strategic complementarity), we have (i) dym (x) =dx 
0; (ii) dxm (y) =dy  0 and (iii) @2V (;x)@x@ > 0. Moreover, there exists a unique ST equilibrium
which coincides with the (unique) KS equilibrium.
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Proof. Under Assumption 1, ym (x) is the unique solution of the equation
@U(med;x;y)
@y
= 0.
From our assumption that @
2U(med;x;ym(x))
@y2
< 0, we deduce from the implicit function theorem
that ym is dierentiable, with
dym(x)
dx
=  
@2U(med;x;ym(x))
@x@y
@2U(med;x;ym(x))
@y2
 0 (5)
from Assumption 3. The proof of (ii) is obtained similarly.
From dierentiating (3) and Assumptions 1 and 3, we deduce that @
2V (;x)
@x@
> 0. This implies
that V is (strictly) single-crossing. Therefore, from Gans and Smart (1996) and Rothstein
(1990), we deduce that V admits a majority equilibrium. We oer a direct proof by showing
that this majority equilibrium coincides with xF (med). To do so consider med and x
F (med)
the (unique) global peak of V (med; x).
13 For any , we dene
	(; x)  U  ; xF (med) ; ym  xF (med)  U (; x; ym(x)) :
For any x < xF (med), we can write
	(; x) =
Z xF (med)
x
@V (; t)
@x
dt > 0:
Assuming that  > med, we further obtain
	(; x) 	(med; x) =
Z 
med
Z xF (med)
x
@2V (b; t)
@x@
dtdb > 0:
We deduce that 	(; x) > 0 and therefore that a strict majority of voters prefer xF (med) to
x. A similar argument holds for any x > xF (med). Hence, x
F (med) cannot be defeated by a
majority, since any majority against xF (med) would have to consist in part of agents  > med,
a contradiction.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is pretty simple. Assumptions 1 and 3 together ensure
that the reduced utility V is single-crossing. The median voter then anticipates in the rst stage
13If U is strictly concave, then for any , U (; x; y) has a unique (global) peak. By denition of ym (x), we
deduce that xF (med) is the unique (global) peak of V (med; x).
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that he will remain decisive in the second stage as well. In his rst-stage choice of x, he then
ignores (by an envelope theorem argument) the indirect eect of x on his utility, and chooses
the optimal value of x given the value of y that will result in the second stage. The resulting
policy bundle (xF (med); ym(x
F (med))) constitutes the unique Stackelberg equilibrium.
In Proposition 4, we have not assumed that V is single-peaked. If we had, denoting by
xF () the peak of V (; x), we would deduce from the argument used in the last part of the
proof of Proposition 4 that xF is strictly increasing.
It is well known that single-crossing and single-peakedness are two logically independent
properties. The following proposition states that under some additional assumptions on U , at
least a majority of the electorate has single-peaked indirect utility functions.
Proposition 5 In the bidimensional majority voting setting with a unidimensional type space,
if the function U(; x; y) is strictly concave in (x; y) for all  and satises Assumptions 1 (mar-
ginal single-crossing) and 3 (strategic complementarity) and if @
3U(med;x;y)
@x2@y
< 0, @
3U(med;x;ym(x))
@x@y2
<
0 and @
3U(med;x;ym(x))
@y3
< 0 then V (; x) is single-peaked in x for all   med.
These conditions on preferences involve the third derivatives of U . Note that these assump-
tions are satised in Example 1 if, for instance P (x; y) =  (x) (y) with  > 0;  0 > 0;  00 < 0,
 000 < 0 and with  00 =( 0)2 <  1 to ensure that U is concave in (x; y).14
Propositions 4 and 5 assume that both dimensions are strategic complements. If dimensions
are not strategic complements, then the argument used to prove that V is single-crossing does
not hold and the issue of existence of a ST equilibrium arises. Moreover, even if we assume
that V is single-peaked, the most-preferred rst-stage value of x need not be monotone in 
anymore. In that case, it is necessary to consider the decreasing rearrangement ex of x (as in the
proof of part (i) of Lemma 1). Then the median outcome xmed is the solution to the equation
F ( : ex ()  xmed) = 1
2
;
14Note that, although the assumptions 	0 > 0; 	00 < 0 and 	000 < 0 can not be simultaneously met on the
whole real line, the domain over which they are satised may be arbitrarily large. A polynomial example is
available upon request from the authors.
17
and in general xmed 6= x (med).
To go beyond these general cases, we need to put more structure on the utility function. In
the next section, we focus on a family of utility functions that has been studied at length, for
instance in the nation formation literature.
2.3 One-sided Separability
In this subsection, we focus on the environment described in Example 3, which has received a
great deal of attention in dierent elds. This setting is characterized by both a horizontal and
a vertical dimension. As already pointed out, Assumption 1 (marginal single-crossing) is not
satised so that this setting calls for a separate tailored treatment.
Let us assume that  2 [0; 1] and
U(; x; y) = v(x)	(y   )  x where x 2 <+ and y 2 [0; 1] : (6)
We assume that v is increasing and strictly concave, and such that v0(0) =1 and v0(x)	 (0) <
1 for x large enough and that 	 is a function with values in <++, symmetrical with respect
to 0 and increasing to the left of 0.15 We also assume that the function 	 is dierentiable
everywhere, so that 	0(0) = 0.16 This general form describes the situation of a public policy
program with a vertical dimension x (the quantity or quality level of a public good) and a
horizontal dimension y (a characteristic of the public good, such as its color, location,...). The
type  of a voter represents her most-preferred public good variant y among all feasible options:
any departure from this ideal choice decreases her utility for any value of x. Also, for any xed
type of public good y, each voter derives a gross benet from this public good consumption
which increases with x. We assume that the unit cost of production of the public good is one,
that there is a mass one of consumers, and that public provision is nanced with a lump sum
15Therefore, it is decreasing to the right of 0. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), Etro (2006) and Gregorini
(2009) consider the specic case where 	(y; ) =   j   yj where  is a parameter larger than 1.
16This dierentiability assumption is not necessary for our arguments but allows to signicantly simplify some
proofs.
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tax. We thus have to subtract x from the gross utility to obtain the net utility of the public
good. Note that we consider here a setting slightly more general than the one described as
Example 3. The function U(:) is assumed to be strictly concave in x but not necessarily in y,
as we make no concavity assumption on the function 	(:).
We start by looking at the ST procedure where citizens vote rst over x and then over y.
This is the sequence the jurisdiction and nation formation literature have focused on. Note
rst that the majority choice over y does not depend upon x, while the converse is not true,
as an individual's willingness to pay for the public good depends on its location. We dub this
property one-sided separability. Whatever the value of x, the majority choice over y, which we
denote by ymed; is given by
ym(x) = y(x; med) = ymed = med:
Given ymed, the reduced utility function takes the form
V (; x) = v(x)	(ymed   )  x:
Given our assumptions on v and 	, V is a concave function of x with a peak at x() where
x() is the unique solution x of the equation
v0(x)	(ymed   ) = 1; (7)
which is the familiar rule equating the marginal utility from the public good to its marginal
taxation cost for individual . It is clear that this peak decreases continuously as  moves away
from med, both to the left and to the right of med. As the function V (:) is concave in x, we
can apply the median voter theorem and assert that there exists a majority equilibrium value
of x; which corresponds to the median most-preferred value of x when y = ymed. As should
be obvious from (7), this decisive individual is not the individual with the median location
med, since this individual is the one with the largest willingness to pay for the public good,
but rather the individual with the median distance to the median (i.e., the median value of
jymed   j, since the function 	(:) is symmetrical around zero). We explain in Appendix 5 how
to solve for the median optimal value of x, which we denote by xmed.
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From the above arguments, we deduce that (xmed; ymed) is the unique ST equilibrium when
voting rst over x and then over y. It is also clear that this policy pair is the unique KS
equilibrium as well, since ym(x) = ymed whatever the value of x. We thus have the following
Proposition.
Proposition 6 Given the utility function (6), the policy (xmed; ymed) is the (unique) Kramer-
Shepsle equilibrium and it coincides with the Stackelberg equilibrium when people vote rst over
x and then over y.
We now study the Stackelberg equilibrium when we reverse the vote sequence. Given an
arbitrary value of y from the rst vote, consider the second stage of the game{ i.e., the vote over
x. Since the utility function (6) is concave in x, we can apply the median voter theorem to learn
that the majority-chosen x is the median most-preferred value of x given y. The most-preferred
value of x of individual  given y is
x(y; ) = (v0) 1

1
	(y   )

;
which is symmetrical in  around y, and decreasing as  moves away from y. Assume without
loss of generality that y  ymed. Two cases can materialize. In the rst one, the decisive voters
are the individuals located at a distance  from y (to the left or to the right) and such that
F (y + )  F (y   ) = 1
2
; (8)
i.e., such that exactly 50% of the polity is located at a distance at most equal to  from y (and
thus prefer a larger value of x than x(y; y )). Note that equation (8) has a solution provided
that y is such that F (2y)  1=2: In words, the majority-chosen value of y must not be too far
from the median (too small if we start with y  ymed as assumed here, or too large if we had
rather started with y  ymed). If y is far enough from ymed, then the decisive voter is the one
with the median location, med, with all the voters with  < med preferring a larger (resp.,
lower) value of x than x(y; med) if y  ymed (resp., if y > ymed) and all voters with  > med
preferring a lower (resp. larger) value of x if y  ymed (resp., if y > ymed).
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This shows that the identity of the decisive voter(s) in the second stage changes continuously
with the choice made in the rst stage. In terms of policy, this implies that
xm(y) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(v0) 1

1
	(y med)

if y  y;
(v0) 1

1
	((y))

if y  y  y;
(v0) 1

1
	(y med)

if y  y;
where (with an abuse of notation) y is the unique solution to the equation F (2y) = 1=2; y
is the unique solution to the equation F (2y   1) = 1=2 and (y) is given by (8).
Figure 3 depicts the case where F is uniform. Panel (a) shows that (y) is dened only
when y is at most distant of 1/4 from the median value of y, and is constant when it exists. If
y is lower than 1/4 or larger than 3/4, the decisive voter in the choice of x is 1/2, as shown in
panel (b). For intermediate values of y, there are actually two types of decisive voters (panel
b), both distant of 1/4 from y (panel (a)). Panel (c) shows the majority-chosen value of x for
any given y; xm(y): it rst increases with y (since the decisive voter remains the same, while
his distance from the chosen y decreases), then it is constant with y (even though the identity
of the decisive voters changes with y, they all remain at the same distance from the chosen y),
and nally decreases with y (as the distance between the decisive voter, located at 1/2, and y
increases).
Insert Figure 3 about here
The previous analysis shows that in the second stage, the decisive voter type changes con-
tinuously with the choice made in the rst stage. Moving backward to the rst stage voting
over y, we assume that the indirect utility function of a citizen of type , which is given by
W (; y) = v(xm(y))	(y   )   xm(y); is single-peaked in y for all . Proposition 7 (proved
in Appendix 6) shows that individuals have no incentive to vote for y =  in the rst stage.
Strategic considerations related to the second-stage choice of x drive them to vote for a value
of x that diers in a systematic way from .
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Proposition 7 Given the utility function (6), if W (; y) is single-peaked in y for all , voting
rst over y and then over x, in the rst stage:
Voters of type  < y (with F (2y) = 1=2) always vote for a value of y larger than their
peak ;
Voters of type  > y (where F (2y   1) = 1=2) always vote for a value of y smaller than
their peak .
Voters of type y    y always vote for a value of y larger (resp., smaller) than their
peak  if () decreases (resp., increases) with . The sign of the derivative of () with respect
to  only depends upon the distribution function F .
The intuition runs as follows. Individuals know that, if they obtain their \naive" most-
preferred location y =  in the rst-stage, the majority-chosen public good level x will be much
lower than their most-favored level, because they will be the ones with the largest willingness
to pay for the public good. A small departure from y =  then has a second-order direct cost
(because, although less appealing, the location remains close to their rst-best choice) but a
rst-order gain, provided that this departure leads to a larger amount of public good in the
second stage. Voters whose peak is to the left of y anticipate that a rst-stage choice close
to their peak will result in the median voter med being decisive in the second stage. A value
of y slightly larger than  will then induce a larger second-stage value of x, as it increases the
willingness to pay for the public good of the med individual (since it decreases the distance
between the rst-stage location choice and his most-preferred location). A similar reasoning
explains why individuals located to the right of y always prefer a value of y that is smaller than
their rst-best choice . Individuals with intermediate preferences (y    y) anticipate
that voters located at a distance (y) from y will be decisive in the second stage. They then bias
their rst-stage choice in order to decrease this distance, so that the decisive voter increases
his most-preferred public good amount. We show in Appendix 6 that the distance (y) is a
function of the distribution function F only.
Finally, while restrictive, the assumption that W (; y) is single-peaked in y for all  is not
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vacuous, as we show in an example in Appendix 6.
From Proposition 7, we gather that the rst-stage, most-preferred values of x need not be
monotone in  (once strategic considerations are taken into account), so that the individual
with the median type med need not be the decisive voter. A more precise assessment of the
identity of the rst-stage median voter would necessitate the introduction of functional forms
for the utility function 	 and for the distribution function F . Observe that, in the special case
where F is uniform as in the illustration above, the distance (y) is a constant (see Figure 3)
so that individuals located between 1/4 and 3/4 have no incentive to distort their rst-period
choice and vote for y = . The decisive individual in the rst stage is then med, and the
rst-stage choice of location is one half. In that special case, the KS equilibrium is also the ST
equilibrium for both voting sequences.
3 Two-Dimensional Types
In this section, we move to the situation where the type of a voter is two-dimensional. The
statistical distribution of types  = (1; 2) among the voters is now described by a continuous
(i.e. absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on <2) cumulative distribution
function F whose support is (a subset of) <2; we denote by f the corresponding density. The
utility of a citizen of type  for policy (x; y) remains denoted by U(; x; y), which is assumed
to be twice continuously dierentiable and concave in (x; y) :
We skip the analysis of the simultaneous voting setting as, in contrast to the one-dimensional
case, it is very similar to what is done in theoretical political science (Banks and Austen-Smith
(1999), Ordeshook (1986)). Instead, we focus on the analysis of the sets of Kramer-Shepsle
and Stackelberg equilibria. A new phenomenon appears. In contrast to the one-dimensional
type setting where the Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium was unique as soon as the voters' utility
functions were strictly concave in both variables (see Proposition 3), in the two-dimensional
type setting there may exist several KS equilibria.17
17The working paper version of this article shows that there always exists at least one KS equilibrium when
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There is little we can say at this level of generality about the existence or characteristics
of the Stackelberg equilibria, and their relationship with the KS equilibria. In this section, we
content ourselves with providing an example (using the spatial model with quadratic preferences
most often studied in the formal political science literature, such as in Banks and Austen-Smith
(1999) or Ordeshook (1986)) illustrating that i) we may have multiple KS equilibria, ii) KS
equilibria need not be Stackelberg equilibria and iii) KS equilibria need not correspond to any
voter's most-preferred policy.
In this example, voters are heterogeneous with respect to both the location of their most-
preferred policy and the shape of their indierence curves (i.e., the direction and intensity of
the correlation between the two policy dimensions). We consider the case depicted in Figure
4 below, where 5 voters are identied by their ideal policies, located at the points a; b; c; d; e;
respectively.
Insert Figure 4 about here
We retain for voters a; d and e the simplest conguration of circular level curves around their
ideal points.18 The indierence curves of individuals b and c are instead represented by two
ellipses centered around their ideal points, for which we choose dierent shapes.19 We depict
in Figure 4a the lines y(; x) (obviously, y(; x) is a horizontal line through point  for voters
 = a; d; e), as well as ym(x) in bold. We proceed similarly in Figure 4b, showing the lines
x(; y) together with xm(y). We report both xm(y) and ym(x) on Figure 5, and we obtain 3
KS equilibria: points c and d, but also a third point k that does not correspond to any voter's
most-preferred location!
preferences satisfy the marginal single-crossing condition for both dimensions of types. It also shows that policy
variables x and y are strategic complements when preferences satisfy both the marginal and joint single-crossing
conditions.
18We do not represent level curves for these voters to avoid cluttering the gure further. See the working
paper version of this article for an analytical description of the preferences in matrix terms.
19The equations of the ellipses represented in the gure are (x  4)2   2(x  4)(y  3) + 2(y  3)2 = 1 for the
small ellipse around b; (= 15 for the bigger one) and 4 (x  5:4)2   3(x  5:4)(y  4) + (y  4)2 = 9 for the level
curve of individual c:
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Insert Figure 5 about here
As for Stackelberg equilibria, we observe numerically that both V (; x) = U(; x; ym(x)) and
W (; y; xm(y)) are single-peaked for all ve voters. Moreover, location c constitutes the unique
Stackelberg equilibrium, whatever the sequence of votes.
4 Conclusions
Majority voting over a multidimensional policy space leads in general to negative results, re-
quiring very stringent conditions for the existence of an equilibrium outcome when voting
simultaneously over all dimensions. Such results have induced political economy scholars to
introduce specic and restrictive assumptions on individual preferences, on the distribution of
individuals' types across the population and on the voting rule, often based on a sequential
scheme.
Our paper takes one step back: it assumes utility functions and a distribution of types as
general as possible, and it focuses on two specic alternatives to simultaneous majority voting.
Our analysis of Kramer-Shepsle and Stackelberg equilibria leads to promising results. We show
that it is possible to conclude about the existence of these equilibria starting from simple
single-crossing conditions widely used in the literature. Under the same weak assumptions, we
compare the characteristics of the solutions issued by the two voting procedures under exam,
emphasizing the relevance of the median type preferred policy. We also study the uniqueness
of equilibrium solutions, showing that multiple Kramer-Shepsle equilibria become plausible
when the domain of individual preferences is richer. While developing our analysis in a general
setting, we also study thoroughly an environment modelled in the political economy literature
exploring issues such as the quantity and the location of public goods in modern democracies,
the connection with the size of the nations and the stability of national borders to secession
threats.
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Both additional theoretical advances and further applications could enrich and complete
our main ndings. Along the rst line, it would be interesting to study a model where the set
of alternatives consists in a nite hypercube and where voter preferences are orderings. Along
the second research line, we recommend a systematic comparison of KS and ST equilibria in
the main models studied in the applied political economy literature, in the spirit of De Donder,
Le Breton and Peluso (2009).
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Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1
i) Since the utility U is strictly concave with respect to x, for any given value of y (resp.
x), the payo of a citizen of type  is maximized for a choice x (y; ) (resp. y(x; )) such that
@U(; x (y; ) ; y)
@x
= 0 (resp.
@U(; x; y(x; ))
@y
= 0).
From the implicit function theorem, we deduce
@x (y; )
@
=  
@2U(;x(y;);y)
@@x
@2U(;x(y;);y)
@x2
and
@y (x; )
@
=  
@2U(;x;y(x;))
@@y
@2U(;x;y(x;))
@y2
:
Take any y in Y and let xy(:) : [; ] ! R be dened by xy() = x (y; ) and Gy be the
cumulative distribution function dened on the interval X as follows:
Gy(x) = F
 
 2 [; ]	 : xy()  x :
We claim that there exists a unique value of x such that:20
Gy(x)  1
2
and G y (x) 
1
2
:
Indeed, suppose on the contrary that there exist two values x1 < x2 satisfying the above
inequalities. Since 1
2
 G y (x2)  Gy(x1)  12 , we deduce that
Gy(x1) =
1
2
Since 1
2
 Gy(x2)  Gy(x1), we obtain that Gy(x2) = 12 . This implies that the cumulative
function Gy is constant with the value
1
2
on the interval [x1; x2]. We now show that this is not
possible. Consider the sets
A1 

 2 [; ]	 : xy()  x1g and A2   2 [; ]	 : xy()  x2g:
Let 1 and 2 be such that xy(1) = x1 and xy(2) = x2. Since xy is continuous, we deduce
from the intermediate value theorem that such values of  exist. Suppose without loss of
20For any increasing function G and any real number x, G  (x) = Lim
y!x;y<xG(y) denotes the left limit of G at
x.
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generality that 1 < 2. From the intermediate value theorem again, for any value of x
 in
]x1; x2[, there exists 
 2 ]1; 2[ such that xy() = x. Let  > 0. From the continuity of xy,
there exists a small interval [   ;  + ] & ]1; 2[ with  > 0 and xy() 2 (x   ; x + ) for
all  2 [   ;  + ]. Since F has full support, we deduce that F ([   ;  + ]) > 0 and
therefore Gy ((x
   ; x + )) > 0. This implies that Gy(x2)  Gy(x1)+Gy ((x   ; x + )) >
1
2
. But this contradicts the earlier claim.
Let x be the unique solution x of the inequalities Gy(x)  12 and G y (x)  12 . To conclude,
it remains to show that x is the unique Condorcet winner. It is clearly a Condorcet winner
as for any x < x, by strict concavity of U(; :; y) all types in the set

 2 [; ]	 : xy()  xg
strictly prefer x to x. A similar argument holds for any x > x.
We now show that there is no other Condorcet winner. Suppose that there is another one,
say x. Without loss of generality, assume that x < x. Then, from the denition of x;
Gy (x
) < 1
2
. Since Gy is right continuous, there exists n large enough such that Gy
 
x + 1
n

<
1
2
. This implies F
 
 2 [; ]	 : xy()  x + 1ng > 12 . By concavity of U(; :; y) all types in
the set

 2 [; ]	 : xy()  x + 1ng strictly prefer x + 1n to x. This contradicts our
assumption that x is a Condorcet winner.
ii) From Assumption 1, we deduce from above that:
@x (y; )
@
> 0 and
@y (x; )
@
> 0:
From these monotonicity properties, we obtain immediately that xm(y) = x(y; med) and
ym(x) = y(x; med)).
Appendix 2: If (xs; ys) is a local Condorcet winner, then (d)  1
2
for all d
First note that
U(; (xs + "dx; y
s + "dy))  U(; (xs; ys))
= "'() + "2[
1
2
@2U(; (xs; ys))
@x2
(dx)
2 +
1
2
@2U(; (xs; ys))
@y2
(dy)
2
+
@2U(; (xs; ys))
@x@y
(dxdy)] +M()0("
2);
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where M() is a constant depending upon . Assume that (xs; ys) is a local Condorcet winner,
but that there exists d, such that (d) > 1
2
. Since the measure F is regular,21 for any  > 0 there
exists a compact subset 
 

 2 [; ] : '() > 0	 such that F ( 2 [; ] : '() > 0	 n
) <
. Select  such that
R


dF > 1
2
and let C = Sup
2

1
2
@2U(;(xs;ys))
@x2
+ 1
2
@2U(;(xs;ys))
@y2
+ @
2U(;(xs;ys))
@x@y
+
M() and c = Inf
2

'(). For all " such that " < c
C
; we deduce that U(; (xs + "dx; y
s + "dy)) 
U(; (xs; ys)) > 0 in contradiction to our assumption that (xs; ys) is a local Condorcet winner.
Appendix 3: Existence of KS equilibria
To prove this claim, we have to prove that the set valued mapping M from Z into Z such
that M(x; y) = M1(y)M2(x) has a xed point. We claim that the correspondence is upper
hemi continuous. Indeed, let xn ! x and yn ! y when n!1. By continuity, we deduce that
from all  2 ; , U(; x; yn) ! U(; x; y) for all x and U(; xn; y) ! U(; x; y) for all y. Let
R1n() and R
2
n() be the marginal weak orders induced on X and Y by U(; :; yn) and U(; xn; :).
From what precedes, for all  2 ; , R1n() converges to R1() and R2n() converges to R2n()
for the topology of closed convergence where R1() and R2() are the marginal weak orders
induced on X and Y by U(; :; y) and U(; x; :). This almost sure convergence with respect to
 implies that the marginal mapping U1yn (respectively U
2
xn) converges to the marginal mapping
U1y (respectively U
2
x) for the  metric dened in Banks, Duggan and Le Breton (2006). The
upper hemicontinuity of M1 and M2 follow from proposition 25 in Banks, Duggan and Le
Breton. (2006)22. Existence of a KS equilibrium follows from Kakutani 's theorem.
21Heuristically, a regular measure on a topological space is a measure for which every measurable set is
"approximately open" and "approximately closed". Any Borel probability measure on any metric space is a
regular measure. Therefore, all interesting probability measures are regular. We refer the reader to Billingsley
(1999) for a concise denition.
22When there is a nite number of individuals, existence follows from Duggan (2001) or Shepsle (1979). The
extra eort needed here arises from the fact that we consider a continuous distribution of voters. A direct proof
avoiding the appeal to proposition 25 in Banks, Duggan and Le Breton (2006) could be provided but would
require extra cumbersome notations.
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Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 5
Note rst that if   med, then the ideal point (x () ; y ()) of U(; x; y) is such that
x ()  x (med) and y ()  y (x () ; med). Since U(; x; y) is strictly concave, then, if the
function ym is concave, for all   med, we have that
V (; x) =Max U(; x; y) subject to the constraint y  ym (x)
is single-peaked with respect to x. The concavity of the ym function guarantees that the indirect
utility of all   med is single-peaked, because the location of their utility peak compared to
ym ensures that they maximize their concave utility on a convex set.
We now prove that if U satises the properties assumed in the proposition, then ym is indeed
concave. From the dierentiation of (5), we obtain
d2ym (x)
dx2
=  
h
@3U(med;x;ym(x))
@x2@y
+ @
3U(med;x;ym(x))
@x@y2
dym(x)
dx
i
@2U(med;x;ym(x))
@y2
@2U(med;x;ym(x))
@y2
2
+
h
@3U(med;x;ym(x))
@x@y2
+ @
3U(med;x;ym(x))
@y3
dym(x)
dx
i
@2U(med;x;ym(x))
@x@y
@2U(med;x;ym(x))
@y2
2
Since @
2U(med;x;ym(x))
@y2
< 0; dym(x)
dx
> 0 and @
2U(med;x;ym(x))
@x@y
> 0, if @
3U(med;x;y)
@x2@y
< 0, @
3U(med;x;ym(x))
@x@y2
<
0 and @
3U(med;x;ym(x))
@y3
< 0 then d
2ym(x)
dx2
< 0:
Appendix 5: Majority choice of x in section 2.3
The most-preferred value of x decreases from x  v0 1( 1
	(0)
) to x  v0 1( 1
Min(	(ymed);	(ymed 1)))
as  moves away from med. Without loss of generality, suppose that 	(ymed)  	(ymed   1).
The proportion B(x) of voters with an ideal peak below the xed level x is given by :
B(x) =
8><>: F

ymed  	 1

1
v0(x)

if x  x;
F

ymed  	 1

1
v0(x)

+
h
1  F

ymed +	
 1

1
v0(x)
i
if x  x;
where x is the unique solution to the equation
v0(x) =
1
	(ymed   1) :
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When F is symmetric, ymed =
1
2
, x = x and B is a cumulative distribution function on
[x; x] dened as follows:
B(x) = 2F

1
2
 	 1

1
v0(x)

:
Then, the majority choice xmed is the unique solution x to the equation :
F

1
2
 	 1

1
v0(x)

=
1
4
:
For instance, when F is uniform, xmed is the peak of a voter located at a distance from the
median equal to 1
4
.
Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 7
The rst-order condition for y of an individual  is given by
v0(xm(y))	(y   )dxm(y)
dy
+ v(xm(y))	
0(y   )  dxm(y)
dy
= 0:
Our objective is to assess under what circumstances the value of y that maximizes W (; y)
diers from  (which is the \true peak" of the utility function{i.e., the value of y that maximizes
U(; x; y) for any given value of x). To this eect, we evaluate the derivative ofW (; y) at y = 
to obtain
@W (; y)
@y
jy= = dxm()
dy
[v0(xm())	(0)  1] + v(xm())	0(0):
The function xm(y) is characterized by the equality v
0(xm(y))	(d)  1 = 0; where d = ()
if y    y and d =    med if  < y or  > y. Therefore, the above derivative is equal
to
@W (; y)
@y
jy= = v0(xm()) [	(0) 	(d)] dxm()
dy
+ v(xm())	
0(0)
= v0(xm()) [	(0) 	(d)] dxm()
dy
;
as 	0(0) = 0. Since 	(0) 	(d) > 0; the sign of the derivative at y =  is the same as the sign of
dxm()=dy. If  < y
, xm() = x(; med) so that dxm()=dy > 0. If  > y, xm() = x(; med)
so that dxm()=dy > 0. If y
    y, xm() = x(;   ()) and we obtain that
dxm(y)
dy
=  v
0(xm(y))	0((y))
v00(xm(y))	((y))
d(y)
dy
:
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Since 	0() < 0, the sign of dxm(y)=dy is the opposite of the sign of d(y)=dy. From the
denition of (y) and the implicit function theorem, we obtain that
d(y)
dy
=
f(y    (y))  f(y +  (y))
f(y +  (y)) + f(y    (y)) ;
so that the sign of d(y)=dy depends exclusively upon the shape of the density function f:
We now provide an example where W (; y) is single-peaked in y for all . Consider for
instance the case where F is uniform, v(x) = 2
p
x and 	(y   ) = K   (y   )2 where K is a
suciently large positive constant. We obtain that
xm(y) =
8><>:
 
K   1
4
  y2 + y 2 if y  1
4
or y  3
4
; 
K   1
16
2
if 1
4
 y  3
4
;
and therefore that
W (; y) =
8><>: 2
 
K   1
4
  y2 + y   K   (y   )2   K   1
4
  y2 + y 2 if y  1
4
or y  3
4
;
2
 
K   1
16
  
K   (y   )2   K   1
16
2
if 1
4
 y  3
4
:
This indirect utility function is single-peaked for all  2 [0; 1]. The graph of W (; y) for
several values of  when K = 1 is represented in Figure 6.
Insert Fig. 6 about here
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Figure 5: KS equilibria with quadratic example
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Figure 6: W(θ,y) for θ ={0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8 } when K = 1
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